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approach of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.G7 Alternatively, the court could follow the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure and allow defendants to take depositions without court
0rder.~8 The Uniform Rules contain some protection for both the
prosecution and the defense, and the court could devise further
protections if such appeared necessary. A third "middle ground"
alternative adopted by some states is to allow discovery depositions
only on court order.69
Whatever alternative the court may select can only be superior t o
the present scheme of rule 8 l(e). That scheme all too easily leads, as
the Nielsen case demonstrates, to artificial construction or even
misconstruction of statute and rule and to an ad hoc creation of rules
of criminal procedure.

FOR REFUSING TO
Torts-ATTRACTIVE
NUISANCE-ANEW RATIONALE
EXTENDLIABILITY
FOR INJURIES
CAUSEDBY NATURAL
CONDITIONSLoney u. McPhillips, 268 Or. 378, 521 P.2d 340 ( 1 9 7 4 ) .

The attractive nuisance doctrine has not generally been applied to
injuries arising from natural conditions on pr0perty.l For some time,
however, commentators have urged that liability be applied regardless of the origin of the ~ o n d i t i o n .They
~
have argued that all cases
to date denying attractive nuisance liability for natural conditions
have involved hazards which the child should have u n d e r ~ t o o d ,and
~
that in the great majority of instances the burden on the landowner
of removing the hazard would be exce~sive.~
The claim is that should
a case arise in which the child does not understand the condition and
in which the burden on the landowner of protecting the child is
relatively light, there is no valid reason why liability should not be
FED. R. CRIM.P. 15. See note 22 s u p a .
68See note 21 supra.
69See note 21 s u p a .
& F. JAMES,THE LAWOF TORTS5 27.5, at 1452 (1956); W.
lSee, e.g., 2 F . HARPER
PROSSER,
THELAWOF TORTS5 59, at 367 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]
;
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
5 339, comment p (1965); Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF.L. REV. 427, 446 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Trespassing Children] ;
2 OKLA.
L. REV.537,537-38 (1949).
2See, e.g., PROSSER
8 59, at 367; Trespassing Children 446; Note, Trespassing Children:
A Study in Expanding Liability, 20 VAND.L. REV.139, 150 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Expanding Liability] ; 2 OKLA.
L. REV.537,538 (1949).
5 59, at 367; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS5 339, comment p (1965);
~PROSSER
Trespassing Children 446.
4
R
~ (SECOND)
S
OF
~ TORTS
~ 5 339,
~
Comment
~
~ p (1965);
~
~Trespassing
~
Children
446.
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extended. Loney u. McPhillips6 presented such a case. Nevertheless,
the Oregon Supreme Court refused to extend attractive nuisance
liability to natural conditions in that case, and in so doing relied upon
a public policy that is unique to the controversy.7
In L o n e y u. MePhillips plaintiff brought an action under the
attractive nuisance doctrine for the wrongful death of his 13-year-old
son. He alleged that defendant owned a stretch of beach along the
Pacific Ocean known as Cape Kiwanda. The beach was within view of
a public highway, offered an excellent view of the ocean, and people
often trespassed there. Plaintiff's son was trespassing at the cape with
friends when he was unexpectedly swept into the sea and drowned.
Plaintiff alleged that because of the tides, the wind, and the peculiar
formation of a cove, the cape was particularly hazardous t o spectators at high tide, and that the children, because of their youth and
inexperience, were unable to recognize this danger. He sought to
hold the defendant liable because of his knowledge of the danger of
the cape, his awareness of frequent child trespasses, and because the
danger could have been averted at little expense by putting up a
fence or a sign.8
The public policy relied upon by the Oregon court in Loney was a
legislatively declared one of keeping privately owned wild lands open
for recreational use. The purpose of this case note is to evaluate the
strength of that public policy as a reason for not extending attractive
nuisance liability to natural hazards. Only the Oregon court's contribution to this controversy will be considered. No attempt will be
made to resolve the broad question of whether attractive nuisance
liability should in all cases be extended to natural hazards. Nevertheless,' in order to put the Loney decision in perspective, the development of the attractive nuisance doctrine since its inception in
Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Co. u. S t o u t g will be traced, and some
of the reasons for extending attractive nuisance liability to natural
hazards will be considered.

Before the Stout case, a landowner generally owed no duty of care
to trespassers except to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring
VROSSER
§ 59, at 367; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS§ 339, comment p (1965);
Trespassing Children 446-47.
'268 Or. 378,521 P.2d 340 (1974).
'The Oregon Court relied upon a legislatively declared public policy of encouraging
private landowners to allow intruders onto their property for outdoor recreational
purposes. Loney v. McPhillips, 268 Or. 378, 384-88, 521 P.2d 340, 343-44 (1974). Apparently such a policy has not been considered by the major text writers. No mention of it is made by Dean Prosser or by Professors Harper and James in their treatises.
See 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES,
THELAWOF TORTS5 27.5 (1956); PROSSER
3 59. Nor does
consideration seem to have been given it by the authors of the Restatement (Second).
See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS,
Reporter's Notes $339, caveat at 135 (1966).
8268 Or. at 37%80,521 P.2d at 340-41.
984 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
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them.1° In Stout, apparently for the first time,ll the defendant was
held to a general negligence standard to trespassing children.12 The
court considered five elements in determining whether he had exercised reasonable care: (1) the nature of the condition, (2) the likelihood of the trespass, (3) the possibility of injury, (4) the utility of
the condition to the landowner, and (5) the burden of removing it. 13
What the Stout case did not do was give any rationale for treating
child trespassers differently from other trespassers.14
To justify a higher standard of care to the infant intruder, the
courts developed an implied invitation theory.15 If it could be shown
that the child had been lured onto the property by an attractive,
dangerous condition created by the landowner, the courts held that
he had in effect extended an invitation to the child. The child thus
went upon his property as an invitee, to whom a duty of reasonable
care was owed.16
This rationale was difficult to apply and led t o a departure from
the general negligence rule of Stout.17 First, since almost every
condition could hold some attraction to a small child, it was difficult
to determine which ones were attractive enough t o make the landowner liable.18 Second, anomalies arose when an injured child was
not attracted onto the property by any condition,lg or was attracted
by a condition other than the one that injured him.20 Thus, if the child
had not been lured onto the property by an "attractive nuisance," it
was entirely possible for a landowner to be free of liability even
though the trespass and subsequent injury to the child were foreseeable and the defect easily remedied.
Courts also recognized that even if the child were attracted onto
the property by the dangerous object, there should be no liability if
the child understood and appreciated the danger. 21 In applying this
general principle, the courts created a class of conditions to which
l0See, e.g., PROS~ER
5 58, at 357; Expanding Liability 140; 26 IND.L.J. 266,267 (1951).
llExpanding Liability 141.
1284 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 661; Expanding Liability 141.
I n Stout a young boy was injured while playing on a railroad turntable on defendant's right-of-way. T h e railroad personnel had seen the children playing on the
turntable, and the turntable could have been rendered harmless to the children at
little expense by latching it in place. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 657-59,662.
I384 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 661-62; Expanding Liability 146.
14See Expanding Liability 141.
15See Expanding Liability 142; 26 IND.L.J. 266,267 (1951).
16See note 15 supra.
17See Note, Liability Resulting From Artificial Bodies of Water, 48 IOWAL. REV.939,
9 U 2 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Artificial Bodies of Water] .
l8See Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 455, 458-59, 208 S.W.2d 843, 855, 857-58
(1948) (dissenting opinion).
IgSee, e.g., United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922); 26 IND.L.J. 266, 268
(1951).
20See, e.g., Holstine v. Director General of Railroads, 77 Ind. App. 582, 591, 134 N.E.
303,306 (1922); 26 IND.L.J. 266,268 n.ll (1951).
2 1 Trespassing Children 455-57.
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the attractive nuisance doctrine would not apply no matter how
attractive or dangerous they were. Children, no matter how young,
were deemed, as a matter of law, to understand natural hazards and
artificial conditions that were duplicative of nature, such as fire,
water, heights, and excavation^.^^ This was known in many states as
the common hazard excepti0n.~3
The weaknesses of the attractive nuisance doctrine with its implied
invitation rationale and common hazard exception soon became
apparent, and scholars began suggesting alternative theories to justify
the higher duty to trespassing children. Professor Leon Green suggested that the voluntary erection of artificial structures on property
automatically gives rise to the legal duty of taking reasonable precautions to prevent injury to trespassing children.24 The different
standard arises because the landowner voluntarily creates conditions
on his property that might prove dangerous to children whose trespass he should have anti~ipated.2~
Other scholars suggested that the
duty of reasonable care could be justified by recognizing society's
It is neither practical nor
interest in the safety of small ~hildren.~6
desirable to expect parents to follow small children around or tie
them to a bedp0st.~7 Under these circumstances, the person often
best situated to make certain that children are reasonably safe is the
landowner upon whose land they trespass. 28 Finally, the imposition
of a general negligence standard was urged on the ground that it was
the best mechanism to balance the competing social interests in the
safety of small children and the free use of private property.29 These
views had a significant influence on the formulation of the rule
finally adopted in section 339 of the Restatement of Torts.30
221d.at 456-57.
23See Pocholec v. Giustina, 224 Or. 245,257,355 P.2d llO4,lllO (1960).
24Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in
Tort, 21 M I C H L.
. REV.495,514-16 (1923).
25Zd.

Green argues that when one voluntarily undertakes certain activities, he is required
by the policy of the law to assume certain affirmative duties with respect to how he
carries out those activities. One who manufactures automobiles assumes an affirmative
duty to inspect them to be certain they are safe. Manufacture of less dangerous products carries with it a lesser duty of inspection. Likewise, a landowner's duty of care to
those coming onto his property innocently (Green refers to children as innocent trespassers because of their inability to appreciate the wrong in going onto another's
property. Id. at 512.) varies with the danger of use to which he has put his property.
Id. at 513-15.
26See Trespassing Children 429; Expanding Liability 14344.
27 Trespassing Children 429.
28Zd.
29Hudson, The Turntable Cases in the Federal Courts, 36 HARV.L. ]REV. 495 (1923)
[hereinafter cited as Hudson].
30See PROSSER
§ 59, at 366 n.45; Trespassing Children 431.
Hudson suggested several items that he thought should be considered in the balancing process, and his suggestions correspond closely to the criteria of RESTATEMENT
OF
TORTS
5 339. Among the elements he suggested in determining whether the landownx
exercised due care were the foreseeability of the child's trespass, the use being made of
the land, the nature of the structure or condition, and the degree of danger. Hudson
845,851-52. See note 31 infra.
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The RestatemenP1 abandoned the "implied invitation" theory. 3 2
Under section 339 liability was based on general negligence principles.33 The attractiveness of the condition was only one element to
be considered in determining the foreseeability of the trespass, not a
necessity for the imposition of liability.34 Further, the Restatement
expressed no common hazard exception for artificial conditions. 35
In all cases involving artificial structures, courts were to consider
whether the child actually understood the danger of the condition. 36
Though the Restatement established a rule of reasonable care
under all the circumstances, even those courts which adopted it still
maintained an exception for certain artificial ~onditions.3~
In the
late 1950's this practice finally began to break down when the
California Supreme Court declared in King v. Lenner~3~
that it would
no longer exempt any class of conditions from application of section
339.39 The inquiry in every case was to be whether the child ac~
courts, likewise influenced by
tually understood the h a ~ a r d . 4Other
the Restatement, have abandoned the common hazard exception at
least as to artificial conditions, and the trend is away from the
categorization of conditions and toward a standard of reasonable
care under all the circumstance^.^^

3
1
R
~ OF STORTS
~ 3 339
~ (1934)
~
~provides
~
~for liability
~
~ to child trespassers under
the following criteria:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor
knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and which
he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious
bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize
the risk involved in intermeddling in it or coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as compared to the risk to the young children involved therein.
5 59, at 366; RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS8 339, comment a (1934); Tres32See PROSSER
passing Children 447-50; Expanding Liability 142-43.
33TrespassingChildren 466-69; Artificial Bodies of Water 944.
S 4 P ~ o s5s59,
~ ~at 368; Trespassing Children 449; Artificial Bodies of Water 945.
35See note 31 supra; Artificial Bodies of Water 942,944.
OF TORTS
5 339, comment c (1934).
S6SeeRESTATEMENT
37ArtiJicial Bodies of Water 943.
3853 Cal. 2d 340,348 P.2d 98 (1959).
In King v . Lennen a one-and-a-half-year-oldchild drowned in a neighbor's swimming
pool. Under prior California case law there would have been no recovery because a
water hazard was not an "attractive nuisance." Id. at 34244,348 P.2d at 99-100.
391d. at 34445,348 P.2d at 100.
There was some indication that California would not only apply the Restatement to
artificial conditions, but to natural ones as well. Id.
401d.
41See, e.g., Zorn v. Bellrose, 22 Ill. App. 2d 331, 160 N.E.2d 685 (1959); Martinez v.
Louis Lyster, General Contractor, Inc., 75 N.M. 639, 409 P.2d 493 (1965); Artificial
Bodies of Water 947.
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In Oregon, attractive nuisance law has generally followed the trend
outlined above. For some time the courts struggled with the question
of what constituted an attractive nuisance.42 Finally, in Pocholec v.
G i ~ s t i n a ,Oregon
~~
adopted a rule very similar to section 339 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,44 and followed the California rule
. ~ ~ in Bosin v. Oak Lodge Sanitary Disof King u. L e n n e ~ ~Later,
t r i ~ t ,it~adopted
~
the new formulation of the rule set out in the
Restatement (Second)P7
With a trend toward a rule of general negligence in attractive
nuisance and the abolition of exempt categories for artificial conditions, scholars have been urging that the natural condition exception
be abolished also.48 They insist that the criteria of the Restatement
(Second); requiring a showing that the child did not understand the
condition49 and that the burden of removal on the landowner would
not have been excessive,50 will protect every legitimate interest of
the land0wner.5~ In a caveat to section 339 of the Restatement
-

42See33 ORE.L. REV.233,234-35 (1954).
43224Or. 245,355 P.2d 1104 (1960).
44244 Or. at 252, 355 P.2d at 1107-08. The court adopted Dean Prosser's refinements
of RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS
8 339. See Trespassing Children 469. Dean Prosser's formulation differs slightly from the rule finally adopted in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
8 339. One such difference is that the Restatement (Second) requires that the injury
arise from an "artificial condition," and Dean Prosser's formulation requires only that
the injury arise from a "condition." In arguing before the Oregon Supreme Court,
plaintiffs counsel in Loney relied upon this word difference and the fact that the court
had previously adopted Dean Prosser's formulation of the rule and not the Restatement's, in an attempt to persuade the court that attractive nuisance liability could
extend to natural conditions under prior Oregon case law. Brief for Appellant at 6,
Loney v. McPhillips, 268 Or. 378,521 P.2d 340 (1974).
45Pocholecv. Giustina, 224 Or. at 2 5 7 4 , 3 5 5 P.2d at 1110-1 1.
46251 Or. 554,447 P.2d 285 (1968).
47Zd.at 558-59,447 P.2d at 287.
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
8 339 provides the following:
Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing
thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or
has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one which the possessor knows or has reason to know and
which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize
the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made
dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of
eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved,
and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise protect the children.
48Seenote 2 supra.
5
0
R
~(SECOND)
S
~OF TORTS
~
~8 339,
~ Comment
~
~ n (1965).
~
~
51See,e.g., Trespassing Children 446-47; Expanding Liability 150. See also 2 OKLA.L.
REV.537,539 (1949).
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(Second), the authors refused to express an opinion on natural conditions because the case law indicates no liability for injuries resulting
from them.52 But the authors explained that in the cases decided
dealing with natural conditions, there would have been no liability
even had the Restatement (Second) m a p p l i e d , because the children understood the hazard.53 They further explained that in the
great majority of cases there would be no liability because the burden on the landowner of removing the hazard would be excessive. 54
The Restatement (Second), therefore, left open the possibility of
liability in a situation where the hazard could not be understood by
the child and the burden of removal was light.55

In refusing to extend liability to natural conditions in Loney v.
McPhillz$s, the court did not rely upon the traditional arguments.
Rather, the basis for the decision was a legislatively declared public
policy of encouraging landowners to allow public access to their
lands for outdoor recreational purposes. 56 This policy, hereinafter
referred to as the free access policy, is embodied in an Oregon statute
that relieves a landowner of liability to intruders coming onto his
property for recreational purposes, unless the landowner is guilty of
a "reckless failure to warn" of a hazardous condition.57 The protection of the statute is available to owners of range land, agiri&ltural
land, forest land, and land adjacent to the ocean.58 The court declared that extending liability under attractive nuisance to natural
conditions would lead to the closure of private lands and would
frustrate the policy behind the statute.59
5
2
R
~(SECOND)
S
~OF TORTS
~
~5 339,
~ ~ ~O ~~ ~p e(1965).
~ n t~
531d.
541d.
551d.
56268Or. at 38448,521 P.2d at 343-44.
5 7 0 ~ REV.
~ . STAT.55 105.665, 105.675 (1974).
5 8 0 ~REV.
~ . STAT.5 105.655(2) (1974).
59268 Or. at 388,521 P.2d at 344.
One wonders why the Oregon statute did not preclude liability in Loney without
need to consider attractive nuisance liability for natural conditions. T h e statute provides that:
(1) An owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the land safe for entry or use
by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity on the land to persons entering thereon for any such
purpose.
ORE.REV.STAT.5 105.665(1) (1974). It further provides that a person does not, by inviting others to come onto his property for recreational purposes, "extend any assurance that the land is safe for any purpose" or "confer upon such persons the legal
status of an invitee or licensee." ORE. REV.STAT.5 105.665(2) (a)-(b) (1974). Recreational purposes, according to the Oregon statute, include sightseeing. ORE.REV.STAT.
$ 105.655(4) (1974). No exception from the statute's grant of immunity is expressed for
child intruders. The only exceptions expressed are for the landowner's "reckless failure
to . . . warn of a hidden danger," or for his negligence to those from whom he receives
compensation for allowing them to use his land. ORE.REV.STAT.5 105.675 (1974).
It appears that the facts of the Loney case were within the statute. T h e land in-
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Assuming the allegations of the complaint to be true, Loney u.
McPhillips was a case where defendant could have been liable under
section 339 had the condition been artificiaL60 The danger at high
tide, created by the cove, was not easily recognizable by children,
and the burden of alleviating it consisted of putting up a fence or
warning sign.61 Further, an extension of liability to natural hazards
in Loney would not have been without precedent in Oregon. Three
Oregon decisions, P o ~ h o l e c , 6B~~ s i n ,and
~ ~ Karoblis v. Liebert, 64
categorically declared that Oregon would no longer classify conditions. Although these cases dealt with artificial conditions, they contained dicta upon which the court could have relied to extend
attractive nuisance liability t o natural hazards. The court's refusal,
therefore, to impose liability draws particular attention to the court's
rationalization for that refusal: the effectuation of the free access
policy. In addition, it should be noted that with growing urbanization and a resulting scarcity of wild lands available for outdoor
recreation, the free access policy will undoubtedly be considered by
a growing number of state legislatures and courts.65
pp

-

-

volved was beach land and would have fit the statutory limitation for land contiguous
to the ocean. ORE.REV.STAT.5 105.655(2) (1974). See ORE.REV.STAT.5 390.650 (1974).
The plaintiffs son was on the land for recreational purposes within the meaning of the
statute, and as pointed out above, there was no exception for child trespassers. It would
seem that plaintiff could only recover by proving defendant's "reckless failure to . . .
warn" rather than negligence. Nevertheless, the court relied upon the public policy
behind the statute and not the statute itself. See 268 Or. at 388,521 P.2d at 344.
The reason for the court's reliance upon the policy of the statute and not the statute
itself may have been a desire to avoid a particularly knotty problem that often arises
with statutes such as the Oregon one here under consideration. Loney v . MePhillips
was decided on a demurrer (268 Or. at 380, 521 P.2d at 341), and in a code pleading
state, like Oregon, matters of affirmative defense cannot be raised on demurrer. See
ORE.REV.STAT.$5 16.260, 16.290 (1974). When faced, therefore, with a statute like the
Oregon statute, courts must decide whether the statute destroys the cause of action or
merely provides an affirmative defense to it. See generally Ellis v. Black Diamond Coal
Mining Co., 265 Ala. 264, 90 So. 2d 770 (1956). If the Oregon statute provides an affirmative defense and does not destroy the cause of action, the statute could not have
been raised on demurrer. The Oregon Court may have decided merely to apply the
public policy behind the statute to avoid having to decide this issue. The question was
nQt briefed by either party.
60Because Loney was decided on demurrer (268 Or. at 380, 521 P.2d at 341), the
truthfulness of the complaint was never judicially determined.
61268 Or. at 380, 521 P.2d at 341. The facts in Loney are surprisingly similar to an
example posited by Dean Prosser in his argument for extending liability to natural
conditions:
Suppose a beach, on which young children in the neighborhood habitually trespass, wade, and swim, with a hidden drop-off ten feet from shore. If it were an
artificial beach, the owner would at least be required to put up a warning sign.
Is he absolved from that responsibility by the fact that the beach has always been
there, and he has not changed it? The prediction may be ventured that he is not.
Trespassing Children 446-47 (footnotesomitted).
62224Or. at 2 5 7 4 , 3 5 5 P.2d at 1110-1 1.
63251 Or. at 560,447 P.2d at 288.
64263Or. 64,69-70,501 P.2d 315,318 (1972).
65Wisconsin has a statute similar to Oregon's which relieves landownen of liability to
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In considering attractive nuisance liability in light of the free
access policy, three questions are apparent. (1) Does the free access
policy justify limiting liability under attractive nuisance to artificial
conditions? (2) What limitations on the scope of the natural hazards
exception does the free access policy suggest? (3) To what standard
of care should the landowner be held if, under the natural condition
exception t o attractive nuisance liability, he has no duty to exercise
reasonable care?

A. Does the Free Access Policy Justify Denying Attractive Nuisance
Liability for Natural Conditions?
This case note does not attempt to suggest an ultimate answer t o
the above-stated question. The problem posed is too broad in scope
and too colored by peculiar local or regional conditions to lend itself
to a simple solution. A rational and sustainable conclusion can be
reached in any given jurisdiction, however, only if several factors are
considered. The first is the degree of closure of recreational lands
that will result if owners thereof are subjected to liability for injuries
caused by natural conditions.
It seems inevitable that some closure of private lands will result
from an extension of liability. It may be true, as many commentators
argue, that attractive nuisance liability for natural hazards will not
put much additional burden on the l a n d ~ w n e r .But
~ ~ the extent of
closure will depend not upon what the additional burden actually is,
but upon what the landowner's perception of his additional burden
is. If the landowner is uncertain about the possible extent of his
liability, or if he is afraid of possible law suits, he might be induced
to close off his land.
Estimating how much closure will occur is a more difficult task,
and perhaps is one that can better be undertaken by legislative rather
than judicial bodies. Nevertheless, whichever body is considering the
question should consider the type of land that is useful for outdoor
recreation. Much of the land so suited will be far removed from the
population centers, and the frequency of child trespass, particularly
without parental supervision, will be greatly reduced. Owners of
intruders for recreational purposes. WIS. STAT.ANN.B 29.68 (1973). A consideration of
the legislative history of the Wisconsin statute gives some indication of the growing
demand for outdoor recreation areas. A group of forest land owners sent out circulars
inviting hunters onto their property in an effort to reduce deer herds that were causing
substantial tree damage. They soon became concerned, however, about the possible
liability that could arise should any of the invited hunters be injured on their property.
I n an effort to forestall liability, the forest land owners influenced the Wisconsin Iegislature to consider the bill relieving them of liability to those entering their land for
recreational purposes. Once it was introduced, however, the bill received support from
sportsmen. Apparently the demand for outdoor recreation areas was great enough that
sportsmen were willing to bear the risk of injury to induce private owners to keep their
lands open. 1964 WIS.L. REV.705,709,713.
%ee, e.g., Loney v. McPhillips, 268 Or. at 389, 521 P.2d at 345 (dissenting opinion);
Trespassing Children 446; 2 OKLA.L. REV.537,539 (1949).
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remote property will likely be much less afraid of attractive nuisance
liability and hence much less inclined to close off their property. The
greatest incidence of closure caused by the imposition of attractive
nuisance liability will undoubtedly occur on property near cities.
Much of this property will not be suited to outdoor recreation and
its closure will not be detrimental t o the free access policy.
Once it is determined that significant closure will occur from
extending liability, there still remains the problem of weighing cornpeting social interests. On the one hand is the interest of society in
the safety of the child; on the other, the interest in keeping lands
suitable for outdoor recreation open in the face of growing urbanization and the resulting scarcity of such lands. In determining whether
liability should be extended, factors such as the current and future
availability of wild lands, the amount that is in state, federal, and
private ownership, and the present and future demand for such lands
should be considered. Also to be considered is the actual effect on
child safety of a refusal to extend liability to natural conditions. If, as
Dean Prosser argued, liability under section 339 would not arise in
the great majority of cases for natural conditions and indeed would
not have arisen in any of the reported natural condition cases before
197 1,67 it appears that attractive nuisance liability for natural
hazards would have, at best, a miniscule effect on child safety. In
analyzing that effect, however, just as in analyzing the effect on
closure, the landowner's anticipation of increased liability, and not
just the actual increase, must be considered. If landowners anticipate
a high risk of financial loss resulting from imposition of liability and
take precautionary measures on their land to avert that loss, perhaps
lands will become significantly safer for the child trespasser.

B. What Limits on the Scope of the Natural Conditions Exception to
Attractive Nuisance Liability Are Suggested b y . the Free Access
Policy ?
If a state decides that the public interest in keeping outdoor
recreation lands available justifies limiting attractive nuisance liability
to artificial conditions, it is questionable whether that limitation
should apply to all land in the state. In limiting the extent of a
landowner's liability to trespassers on recreational lands, states have
recognized that under certain circumstances it is in the public
interest to encourage landowners to allow trespass to their property.
But since the reason for encouraging the allowance of trespass is to
provide more outdoor recreational areas, the limitations on liability
should not apply to landowners whose lands are unsuitable for outdoor recreation. For example, industrial or commercial property is
not suitable for such purposes, and there can be no public interest in
encouraging owners of such property to allow trespass for outdoor
6 7 P ~ o s 3s 59,
~ ~ at 367. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF TORTS§ 339, comment
(1965); Trespassing Children 446.
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sportsmen. The Oregon statute is limited in application t o owners of
agricultural land, forest land, range land, and land adjacent t o the
ocean.68 Yet, in applying the public policy behind the statute and
refusing to extend liability to natural hazards, the Oregon court
apparently included all landowners in the state.G9 Giving such protection to all landowners t o encourage them to open their lands for
recreational use, regardless of whether their lands are suitable for
that use, hardly seems justified. The Oregon court should have
granted a natural hazard exemption from attractive nuisance liability
only to owners of recreational lands. The free access policy relied on
by the court can sustain no broader an exemption.

C. To What Standard of Care Should the Landowner Be Held ih
Under the Natural Conditions Exception t o Attractive Nuisance
Liability, He Has No Duty To Exercise Reasonable Care?
If no natural condition exception is recognized, an owner of
recreational properties will be held to a standard of reasonable care
under the attractive nuisance doctrine. If, however, a court or legislature recognizes a natural condition exception, the question arises as
to what standard of care the landowner will be held. One obvious
alternative standard is found in the common law rule that a landowner is liable only if he wilfully and wantonly injures a trespasser.
The rigor of this standard is de minimus; liability could be imposed
only in exceptional cases of extreme landowner misconduct.
Another alternative standard-a standard higher than the common
law standard yet lower than the reasonable care standard of the
attractive nuisance doctrine-may exist. The Oregon statute would
impose liability on the landowner for a "reckless failure" to guard
against or warn of a dangerous condition.70 Whether this standard is
different from the common law standard of "wilfully and wantonly"
inflicting injury is uncertain. It appears, however, that the common
law standard reached only the active negligence of the landowner,
and would not reach a failure to warn, unless that failure were extreme. Imposing liability on the landowner for a reckless failure to
warn would arguably, therefore, give more protection t o the child
than the common law rule.
Theoretically at least, any landowner liability, even the minimal
liability of the common law rule or the Oregon statute, will induce
some closure and will be inconsistent with the free access policy. As
a practical matter, however, imposition of the common law rule or
the higher Oregon standard will not likely result in much closure. A
minimal standard of care, because more easily met, is not likely to
6 8 0 REV.
~ . STAT. 5 105.655(2) (1974). The Oregon legislature apparently recognized
the problem referred to in the text and carefully limited the immunity to owners whose
lands would most likely be suitable for outdoor recreation.
69268Or. at 387438,521 P.2d at 344.
7 0 0REV.
~ . STAT.§ 105.675 (1974).
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create among landowners as much uncertainty about liability or fear
of litigation. Free of these concerns, a landowner is not likely to take
precautionary measures such as closure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts requires a
weighing of the risk of injury to the child against the utility of the
condition to the landowner and the burden on him of removing it. 71
Dean Prosser once suggested that not only the utility of the condition to the landowner, but also its utility to society should be considered.T2 The Oregon court, in refusing to extend attractive
nuisance liability to natural conditions because of a public interest in
keeping wild land open, in fact considered the utility of the condition
to society. But the refusal to extend liability to natural hazards
under attractive nuisance for the reason given by the court can only
be justified for landowners whose land is suitable for outdoor
recreation.

OURCES OF A P HYSICIAN~SSTANDARD
OF
Torts-MED1c~~
MALPRACTICE-S
CARE:THE MEDICALPROFESSION
OR THE COURTS-Hellingv. Carey, 8 3
Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).

In 1959, Barbara Helling consulted Thomas F. Carey and Robert
C. Laughlin, medical doctors and partners specializing in the practice
of ophthalmology, concerning myopia and was fitted with contact
lenses. In September 1963, she contacted them again regarding irritation to her eyes, and over the next 5 years further consultations took
p1ace.l The doctors considered Mrs. Helling's visual problems to be
solely related to complications with her contact lenses until they
tested her eye pressure and field of vision in October 1968. As a
result of these tests, the doctors discovered that Mrs. Helling, who
was then 32 years of age, had glaucoma2 and that she had lost her
peripheral vision and a significant portion of her central vision. Mrs.
R(SECOND)
~ OF TORTS
~
8 ~339, Comment
~
~n (1965).
~
~
~
~
~
Children 463.
lThese additional consultations occurred in October 1963, February 1967, September
1967, October 1967, May 1968, July 1968, August 1968, September 1968, and October
1968.
2Plaintiff was found to be suffering from primary open angle glaucoma, a condition in
which the nourishing fluids of the eye are unable to escape and flow from the eye
properly. This condition causes an increase in intraocular pressure which ultimately
results in damage to the optic nerve and permanent and irreversible lms of vision. 83
Wash. 2d at 515,519 P.2d at 981.
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